Lobbying ROI Calculator
Cross-referenced lobbying disclosures with federal contract data from USASpending.gov. For every $1 these contractors spent lobbying, they received thousands back in federal contracts.
Lobbying Spend (red) vs. Contracts Received (blue)
The lobbying bars are so small they're barely visible. That's the point.
| Contractor | Category | Lobbying Spend | Federal Contracts | ROI β |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| TriWest Healthcare Alliance | Healthcare | $270K | $13.4B | 49,536:1 |
| Amentum Services | Services | $580K | $3.6B | 6,178:1 |
| Sandia National Labs (NTESS) | National Security | $1.0M | $5.7B | 5,568:1 |
| McKesson Corporation | Healthcare | $3.6M | $11.9B | 3,270:1 |
| Atlantic Diving Supply | Defense Supply | $1.9M | $6.0B | 3,086:1 |
| RTX Corporation | Defense | $2.8M | $7.3B | 2,624:1 |
| QTC Medical Services | Healthcare | $1.2M | $2.9B | 2,488:1 |
| Huntington Ingalls | Defense | $4.4M | $8.6B | 1,931:1 |
| BAE Systems Land & Armaments | Defense | $1.4M | $2.2B | 1,580:1 |
| Raytheon Company | Defense | $10.4M | $16.5B | 1,579:1 |
| Johns Hopkins APL | Research | $2.0M | $2.4B | 1,189:1 |
| The Boeing Company | Defense | $14.9M | $15.4B | 1,040:1 |
| Caltech (JPL) | Research | $2.8M | $2.3B | 822:1 |
| SpaceX | Aerospace | $5.3M | $3.0B | 571:1 |
| Booz Allen Hamilton | IT/Consulting | $12.1M | $6.6B | 541:1 |
| Lockheed Martin | Defense | $141.6M | $58.8B | 415:1 |
| Accenture Federal Services | IT/Consulting | $10.5M | $3.2B | 309:1 |
| Sierra Nevada Company | Defense | $8.0M | $2.2B | 280:1 |
| General Dynamics IT | Defense | $16.7M | $4.6B | 278:1 |
| SAIC | IT/Consulting | $17.2M | $4.4B | 253:1 |
| Leidos | IT/Consulting | $22.8M | $3.0B | 133:1 |
What Drives Lobbying ROI?
The enormous ROI figures on this page raise a natural question: does lobbying cause companies to win contracts, or do large contractors simply lobby to protect their existing positions? The answer is likely both.
Companies with extensive government contracting relationships lobby to protect specific programs, secure favorable contract terms, and influence procurement requirements in ways that favor their products. A defense contractor lobbying on the NDAA isn't just spending money randomly β they're trying to ensure that specific weapons systems get funded, that procurement rules favor established contractors, and that their technology standards become the government's standards.
The revolving door amplifies this dynamic. Former Pentagon procurement officials who become lobbyists for defense contractors bring intimate knowledge of the acquisition process β knowledge that helps their clients navigate a system they once managed.
The Healthcare ROI Anomaly
Healthcare companies dominate the highest-ROI slots in our data, but their situation is different from traditional defense contractors. Companies like TriWest Healthcare Alliance and McKesson Corporation receive massive government contracts primarily through Medicare, Medicaid, TRICARE, and VA health programs.
Their lobbying focuses on maintaining and expanding these program relationships rather than winning competitive procurement bids. When a healthcare company lobbies on Medicare reimbursement rates, they're not bidding for a contract β they're shaping the rules of a market where they're already a participant.
This means healthcare ROI figures, while real, represent a different dynamic than defense ROI. Explore more in our pharmaceutical lobbying and defense lobbying analyses.
Small Firms vs. Giants
Not every lobbying investment pays off equally. Large defense primes like Lockheed Martin ($141M in lobbying) have relatively lower ROI ratios (415:1) compared to smaller contractors that spend modestly. This suggests diminishing returns at scale β or simply that Lockheed Martin lobbies on a much broader range of issues beyond just contracts.
The highest-ROI companies tend to be focused contractors with narrow lobbying agendas: they lobby specifically for the programs that generate their revenue. Broad-based lobbying (on tax policy, trade, regulation) doesn't show up in contract ROI calculations but may deliver value through other channels.
Methodology & Sources
We matched the top federal contractors (by total obligation on USASpending.gov) against lobbying registrants in Senate LDA filings for 2018β2025. Matches were made using exact and fuzzy name matching. ROI = total federal contracts Γ· total lobbying spend.
Federal spending data available at OpenSpending.us.
How We Calculate Lobbying ROI
Our ROI calculation cross-references two public datasets: lobbying disclosures from Senate LDA filings and federal contract awards from USASpending.gov. For each organization, we calculate: ROI = Total Contracts Received Γ· Total Lobbying Spent.
This is a correlational measure, not a causal one. Companies that receive large federal contracts tend to be large organizations that also lobby heavily. The lobbying may help secure contracts, but it may also reflect the natural behavior of companies that already do significant government business. Still, the patterns are striking β especially in the defense sector, where the correlation between lobbying spending and contract awards is strongest.
Sector-by-Sector ROI Comparison
Defense: The highest ROI sector. Top defense contractors like Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and Raytheon receive thousands of dollars in contracts for every dollar spent on lobbying. This reflects the massive scale of defense procurement and the direct relationship between lobbying and contract competition.
Healthcare: Pharmaceutical companies show strong ROI through Medicare/Medicaid reimbursement rates and FDA regulatory outcomes, though the returns are harder to quantify than direct contracts. See our pharma lobbying analysis.
Technology: Tech companiesβ lobbying ROI often manifests as avoided costs β preventing unfavorable regulation rather than securing direct government contracts. Antitrust enforcement delays and favorable privacy frameworks save billions. Explore more on our tech lobbying page.
The Correlation vs. Causation Question
Critics rightly note that high lobbying ROI doesn't prove that lobbying caused contract awards. Large government contractors lobby heavily because they already do extensive government business β the lobbying may be a consequence of their government relationships, not the cause. However, academic research suggests the relationship runs in both directions: companies that increase lobbying tend to see subsequent increases in contract awards, even after controlling for company size and prior contract history.
The most compelling evidence comes from natural experiments β when a company suddenly increases lobbying after a new government program is created, and subsequently wins contracts under that program. These patterns are common in our data and suggest that while lobbying alone doesn't guarantee contracts, it is a meaningful factor in the competitive landscape. Explore the full data on our downloads page.
Related Pages
Data Sources and Methodology
Our lobbying-vs-contracts analysis combines two major public datasets. Lobbying expenditures come from Senate LDA filings processed by OpenLobby. Federal contract awards come from USASpending.gov, which tracks all federal spending above $25,000. We match organizations across both datasets using a combination of exact name matching and fuzzy matching algorithms, with manual review for the top 500 spenders.
For the complete details on our matching methodology and its limitations, see our methodology page.
Data Notes & Methodology
All data on this page is sourced from Senate Office of Public Records lobbying disclosure filings under the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995. Figures reflect reported spending as filed and may be subject to amendment. Quarterly totals are annualized where noted.
Industry classifications follow the Center for Responsive Politics methodology. Where companies operate across multiple sectors, spending is attributed to the primary business classification. Foreign entity designations follow FARA and LDA Section 4 definitions.
Year-over-year comparisons use inflation-adjusted figures (2026 dollars) unless otherwise noted. Historical data extends back to 1998 when electronic filing became mandatory.
For questions about our data or methodology, see our full methodology page or contact us.